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Do constitutions serve intergenerational justice? The pa-
per proposes that constitutionalism should be understood 
as a purely legal concept in order to explore satisfactory 
answers to questions regarding how and whether a consti-
tution helps to promote intergenerational justice. I argue 
that the normative approach can explain that constitutions 
are effective means of approaching (as opposed to hinder-
ing) intergenerational justice. The binding nature of the 
constitution, especially of some unamendable provisions, 
is already justified in doctrine as an essential element of 
all normative orders. I argue that this boundary nature is 
not a hindrance, but rather a helpful reference point for 
all generations in the organisation of society and the state. 
Constitutional texts, together with their interpretations by 
judges, play a significant role in determining the meaning 
of the constitution. The understanding of constitutional 
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provisions might change according to the requirements of 
time and space, while preserving prior knowledge. I argue 
that the normative approach requires, in accordance with 
the rule of law, that the decisions, justified on the basis 
of the constitution, be reasonably justified to the genera-
tion in which the case actually emerges. That enables the 
constitution, with its unamendable provisions, to provide 
a stable framework that is capable of adapting in order to 
serve the needs of future societies. 
Keywords: constitutionalism, intergenerational justice, eter-
nity clause, constitutional court
1. The Framework Discussion
Any discussion regarding the durability and flexibility of a constitution 
begins with Edmund Burke’s famous concept of a constitution as an in-
tergenerational covenant (Burke, 1955). The problem is also present in 
Thomas Jefferson’s, James Madison’s, and Thomas Paine’s works related 
to the foundation of the United States of America (e.g. Jefferson, 1984, 
pp. 959–964). The problem is still present in the most recent publications 
in various social science disciplines, as may be seen by following the dis-
cussion in special issues of the periodical Intergenerational Justice Review.
But why do constitutions matter in view of intergenerational justice? If 
intergenerational justice is based on the equal rights of present and future 
generations, as well as on the responsibility of the present generation to 
preserve the environmental goods and democratic sovereignty of future 
generations, while providing and enforcing the rights that they might want 
to have in the future, then essential legal questions emerge (Tremmel, 
2009). Do constitutions protect the rights or interests of future genera-
tions without becoming undue barriers; i.e., without making it impossible 
for future generations to exercise their sovereignty when the time comes? 
Constitutions can usually be amended. Amendments sometimes amount 
to complete revisions, but in the case of modern constitutions some parts 
remain stable even in those cases – those parts that provide the identity 
of the constitution (Rosenfeld, 2011, p. 671; Jacobsohn, 2010, p. 4). The 
stability of constitutions might differ, but the definition of the constitu-
tion incorporates the notion of some sort of stability, which means some 
sort of engagement for the future (Tushnet, 2012, pp. 226–230).
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Another question is linked to the potential role constitutional courts 
should play in the protection of their generation against the will of past 
generations codified in a constitutional text. Or are courts the guardians 
of earlier regulations and therefore opponents of constitutional change 
(Auerbach and Reinhart, 2012, pp. 17–22)? There is also debate in the lit-
erature if eternity clauses are generationally fair. The prohibition of future 
changes to certain provisions of a constitution take away the possibility 
from future generations to determine their own lives and futures (Roznai, 
205, pp. 15–39).
These questions are important because constitutions seem to be intergen-
erational legal sources by their very nature. They are focused on serving 
many generations. Providing the basic institutions of government, they 
aim to do so for the long run; they express, usually normatively, the funda-
mental values of the people and place certain questions beyond the reach 
of simple majorities. Constitutions are usually difficult to amend precisely 
so that intergenerational stability and continuity may be preserved. Some 
of them state this explicitly in eternity clauses or other entrenchment 
clauses. Constitutions also wish to protect future generations from pres-
ent electorates. That might be labelled paternalism if one were to suggest 
that future generations must be able to respond to their own problems 
(Beckman, 2013, pp. 775–788) in their own time. Constitutions, howev-
er, provide fundamental rights to future generations as well. On the other 
hand, does that not burden the sovereignty of future generations by dis-
enfranchising them from responding to their own problems (Barry, 1978, 
pp. 204–248) in the fashion they deem most prudent?
Constitutions usually fulfil two tasks: one is to protect values, sometimes 
even by eternity clauses and by implicitly forbidding change through fu-
ture amendments. The second is to entrench the rights and values the 
authors of the constitution believe to be important (Brown and Weiss, 
2002, pp 1–5). The question is whether this is entirely just towards future 
generations, as people are not able to predict the future (Kavka, 1978, pp. 
286–303).
The preservation of the same number of options and opportunities for 
action for new generations is sometimes regarded as the most important 
element of intergenerational justice (Brown-Weiss, 2002; Kafka, 1978; 
Barry, 1978). However, the notion of intergenerational justice is much 
more vague than this. The definition of intergenerational justice is almost 
impossible to agree upon, which is why it is not treated as a legal term. 
Rather, a philosophical and general social science approach to under-
standing it is favoured (Tremmel, 2015a, pp. 212–233; Tremmel, 2015b, 
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125–148). The notion of intergenerational justice is often discussed with 
regard to questions of environmental law, because if a society wishes to 
provide equal options for future generations, physical and material cir-
cumstances must clearly be secured (Ekeli, 2007, pp. 378–401). Howev-
er, questions related to the constitutional equality of generations need not 
be based on material equality, according to other approaches (Gosseries 
& Meyer, 2009).
My contribution remains in the legal normative framework and aims to 
analyse the role of the constitution in delivering intergenerational justice. 
I will address the question of the role constitutional courts may play in 
providing a sustainable normative framework for the present and for the 
future. I argue that when constitutional courts are the guardians of the 
constitutions as interpreted by the courts, the requirement of a legal jus-
tification of all decisions will end up in a moderate, cautious approach 
to constitutional change. Constitutional change has its limits within the 
constitutional order and these limits are recognised, expressed, and ob-
served by constitutional courts. The limits of change are settled partly in 
the text of the constitutions, in the eternity clauses, but in many cases by 
means of constitutional interpretation of the constitutional texts as well. 
The required stability or flexibility of the constitution is therefore provid-
ed either by the constitutional text or by the judges. 
I will first argue that, according to the rules of constitutional adjudication, 
courts play a legitimate role in providing justice for every generation and 
preserving the value of intergenerational justice at the same time. Una-
mendability, either established by the text of the constitution or recog-
nised by judicial constitutional adjudication, complicates this argument 
as it points to the limits of the interpretation competence. Hence the 
question remains to what extent such guarantees take away the possibility 
from future generations and future judges to determine their own future.
I conclude that stable constitutions and, what is more, eternity (or en-
trenchment) clauses are fair to future generations and do not deprive 
them of the liberty to exercise self-determination. Constitutions could 
certainly be regarded as indoctrinations from the point of view of future 
generations, but as long as it can be argued on normative grounds that fu-
ture generations are able to challenge the constitution, even its very core, 
I suggest that this does not hinder the sovereignty of future generations. 
The legal normative approach to the constitution makes this act of chal-
lenging possible, whilst on the other hand a normative order is offered for 
future generations as established in the constitution. Normative orders 
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are undoubtedly needed to scale back the intensity of change. This is a hu-
man achievement, a value offered to future generations. They are able to 
adhere to it or reject it, if it is regarded only as a legal normative concept. 
Let me introduce my arguments with an example. We make an effort to 
create rules for our children. Not only is this our constitutional right but 
also our obligation. We are responsible for the children and we establish 
a legal order that allows us to decide for them and in their best interest. 
We interpret our rules for them and although they start reinterpreting 
them, it is we who decide in controversial cases. As soon as they grow 
up, their interpretation will be valid for their lives and they can enforce 
it. Our interpretation will remain subsidiary; they can take it into account 
according to their wishes. It will, however, be there for them, even if they 
are not bound by it anymore. They can opt for continuity and let our inter-
pretation of the rules be a point of reference in their argumentation. They 
can conform to it or depart from it. On the other hand, they can decide 
to fully deny the past and create a new framework of rules. This is their 
decision and their parents cannot stop them.
Constitutions work in similar fashion. A constitution is by nature not only 
an intragenerational but an intergenerational text. Jefferson’s idea of the 
necessity to establish a new constitution every 19 years in order to be fair 
to all generations is unfounded in the concept of the legal constitution 
(Jefferson, 1984, pp. 959–964). Constitutions in a normative sense are 
not enforced according to current political understanding and will. The 
constituent power as such is not a central element of the normative legal 
theories; it is not often present in legal positivism and this fact is impor-
tant in understanding the function of a normative legal constitution. An 
autonomous legal order with the constitution as the auto-valid top norm 
does not have to deal with the notion of constituent power; this is left 
more to decisionist legal theories or outsourced to political science. This 
helps the paper to argue that constitutions serve the interest of intergen-
erational justice. 
I suggest, therefore, that we remain within the framework that the norma-
tive legal concept offers for the understanding of the constitution and its 
unamendability, in order to give satisfactory answers to Jefferson’s con-
cerns about the rights of future generations. For legal constitutionalism, 
judicial constitutional adjudication is essential to observe intra- and inter-
generational law understood as justice.
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2.  A Normative Approach to Understanding a 
Constitution
I suggest that a certain understanding of unamendability (rigidity) be-
longs to the concept of legal constitutionalism, regardless of whether this 
is written in the text or discovered and expressed only by constitutional 
courts. Turning a rule-of-law democracy into an autocracy, e.g. by consti-
tutional amendments, is not a valid legal solution in most constitutional 
democracies, regardless of whether their constitution contains eternity 
or other entrenchment clauses or not. This is because in a rule-of-law 
democracy, a living constitution is partly a judicial construction and in ap-
plying a legal doctrine normative requirements are found to be applicable 
to fundamental constitutional changes. These requirements can validly be 
enforced by the guardians of a legal constitution. Constitutional courts of 
all generations will interpret law and legal doctrine and the interaction of 
the applicable law; institutional safeguards and human conditionality will 
protect the right of future generations to self-determination within the 
framework of the right to self-determination of the present generation.
As András Bragyova, constitutional theorist and former judge of the Hun-
garian Constitutional Court explains, all constitutions – or at least some 
provisions of constitutions – contain values of choice. Parts of these are 
fundamental values that define the identity of the constitution. Parts of 
these values are unamendable, even if this prohibition is not incorporated 
explicitly in the text. They are unamendable because the source of the 
amending power is in the constitution and is derived from it; therefore, 
the pouvoir constitutent derivé (the amending power) is not empowered 
to eliminate its essential parts (Bragyova, 2003, p. 65). “The power to 
amend the constitution was not intended to include the power to destroy 
it” (Marbury, 1919, p. 232). A revolution needs to take place before a 
constitution can be abolished. (Servai, 1999, p. 266). 
The idea of inherent unamendability is mentioned not only in often-cit-
ed case law, but also in mainstream, well-known constitutional doctrine: 
“Amending the constitution must stay within the constitutional frame-
work, this competence is based on the constitution and it cannot override 
it. This competence cannot involve the adoption of a new constitution...” 
(Schmitt, 1928, p. 16).
In modern constitutions, their stability is often guaranteed not by implicit 
but by explicit unamendability provisions. This is usually stated by way of 
eternity (Roznai, 2014, Appendix) or other entrenchment clauses (Albert, 
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2010, p. 706). These provisions provide explicit obstacles to fundamen-
tal amendments to constitutions by stating, in their strictest form, that 
one or more provisions are unamendable. If the prohibition is final, we 
are referring to eternity clauses (Ewigkeitsklausel), and many jurisdictions 
show examples of this (the most famous amongst these is Article 79 (3) of 
the German Basic Law). In Europe, the constitutions of Germany, Italy, 
and France explicitly limit or exclude amendments of certain provisions. 
They do this because they have experienced the dangers that totalitarian 
regimes cause to the individual, society, and the state. As these consti-
tutions usually serve as models for other European constitutions, the in-
clusion of an eternity clause in the constitution has become fashionable. 
The preventive function of such unamendability in France, Germany, and 
Italy, as well as in others copying them, leaves no room for doubt. This is 
elaborated by the German Federal Constitutional Court in its Decision 
BVerfGE 30, 1.1
The unamendability of certain parts of the constitution is firmly discussed 
at the level of constitutional theory as well (Roznai, 2016). Unamendable 
provisions on the republican form of government, on the protection of 
fundamental rights, or on territorial integrity give the impression of legal 
certainty and the inviolability of the basis of constitutional order. Roma-
nia’s constitution offers good examples of all kinds of explicit unamend-
ability.2 Albert (2013, pp. 280–281) makes a valid point that the explicit 
function of unamendability, which significantly affects the constitutional 
culture of values, remains the leading function of unamendability in prac-
tice. In reality, constitutions with eternity clauses could be disregarded or 
annulled completely, in the same way as constitutions without this explicit 
ban concerning the amendment of certain fundamental provisions.
Unamendability, explicit or implicit, in the normative framework, explains 
that there are core provisions in constitutions which cannot be amended, 
despite the will of the overwhelming majority of the people to adopt a 
new constitution, or without the rule of an undemocratic force that im-
plements a new constitution. Research on implicit unamendability is also 
about finding this core – the unamendable part of constitutional design 
by way of judicial interpretation, i.e., by legal methodology. The method is 
further explained and applied by Roznai (2015). Judicial interpretation is 
1 For the function of unamendable clauses within the broader context of constitu-
tional change, see Albert, 2009 and Roznai, 2013.
2 See a complex exemplification in Jacobsohn, 2006.
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not used exclusively by the judiciary. All state actors and all social sciences 
may use legal methods.
However, the judiciary is to give the final interpretation of the text in 
controversial cases. The Indian Supreme Court was the first to discover 
implicit unamendability rooted in the basic structure of the constitution. 
As a consequence, the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amend-
ment has spread globally and attracted promoters amongst constitutional 
judges of the world (Colombia, the Czech Republic, etc., are often points 
of reference in this discussion, see Halmai, 2015, p. 951). The Hungarian 
Fundamental Law of 2011, the newest constitution of the EU, does not 
contain provisions qualified explicitly as unamendable.3 The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, however, in its decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.), declared 
that Hungarian constitutional identity is an inviolable core of the Funda-
mental Law and cannot be overruled. The identity is composed of several 
elements, such as the protection of fundamental rights, the protection of 
human dignity, respect for the historic constitution, and the sovereignty 
of the state.
The duration and rigidity of a constitution cannot be explained without 
taking a stand on how the constitution is understood. This is the first step 
to finding out which understanding of the constitution could better serve 
the interest of future generations. I believe that the role of the constitu-
tion in providing intergenerational justice is often mistreated, as authors 
traditionally treat the constitution as a social fact (Jefferson, 1984). I sug-
gest that the constitution be understood as the supreme law that defines 
the validity of all the norms of the legal system, including the constitution 
(Kelsen, 1967, pp. 35–50).4 Although adopting a constitution (the consti-
tutional moment) is undoubtedly a political act (Tóth and Lánczi, 2012, 
pp. 30–32), the liberal concept of constitutional democracy is based on le-
gal constitutionalism.5 In this Kelsenian concept, a constitution contains 
legal norms at the top of a legal system, which legally define the validity 
of the legal system. This approach could be anticipated as a new level of 
constitutional development, where a limited government and the protec-
tion of fundamental rights are central values. 
3 I examine the Hungarian case in Gárdos-Orosz, 2017. Parts of my argumentation 
in this section are based on this text.
4 The Austrian-German heritage of public law has had a very strong effect on many 
central European countries as well (Boulanger, 2006; Halmai, 2007).
5 On the basic differences between the concepts of legal and political constitution 
and constitutionalism, see Bellamy, 2001
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The strength of the review power of constitutional courts and the activ-
ism of lawyers forming a judicial body are also widely accepted by both 
political elites and legal scholars in this system, because, according to this 
concept, the constitution can only be part of a normative order if it is in-
terpreted and enforced by the state through constitutional adjudication. 
Amendments to a constitution are also parts of this socially constructed 
normative order (von Wright, 1963, p. 16; p. 189). As the normative order 
is always a social construction, it is per se not capable of working against 
the people. The incorporation of society into the constitution leaves room 
for the adaptation of the constitution by interpretation. The adaptation 
is guided by the institutions and the people of an actual living society. 
This concept does not recognise the conflict between present and future 
generations because the law is made continuous by its application and 
interpretation.
A constitution as a special norm contains provisions on the possibility of 
and limitations to its own amendment.6 These provisions are very special 
and the creator of these rules – the constituent power – ceases to exist 
at the very moment of the adoption of a constitution (Beud, 1994, p. 
455). Therefore, one cannot talk about generations in one constitution. 
In agreement with Ross, one can suppose that the final source of law is in 
the constitutional system itself (Ross, 1929, p. 309). Similarly, the source 
of the legitimacy of a constitutional state lies neither with the people nor 
with the constituted state, but rather in a balanced relation between the 
normative order, as the ideal of constitutionalism, and governmental ac-
tion (Loughlin, 2014, p. 222). We, the people, keep questioning if the es-
tablished normative order is still valid, but on the other hand we generally 
trust this achievement.
In modern constitutions, it is usually either the people or the nation who 
are entitled to be the source of power (a double formula is found in both 
the French and Spanish constitution (Art. 3. ill. 1. (2).)), but whichever 
the source, the constitution normatively defines it as such. This is again a 
phenomenon that explains the theoretical impossibility of separating and 
defining different generations within the framework of this normative con-
cept. Without a normative constitution we cannot identify the source of 
state power and the limits of government, nor are we capable of describing 
the limits of constitutional stability or change. The normative nature of the 
6 This opinion is affirmed by the Constitutional Court in its decision on a referendum 
on the constitutional amendment 25/1999. (Decision VII. 7. CC, ABH, 1999, 251, 261).
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constitution implies that the rules on amending the constitution and the 
limits thereof are open to interpretation. This work is done by all state insti-
tutions, but with final force by separate and independent courts.
Popular sovereignty itself is a highly debated concept in modern constitu-
tional thought and is definitely very far from empowering a concrete group 
of people (Jakab, 2016, pp. 92–99). Therefore, the constitution itself cre-
ates a normative ground for the will of the people in order for the constitu-
tion to gain legitimacy, but this reference applies to all people as an abstract 
category and is not capable of recognising or hindering generations.
3. The Role of Constitutional Adjudication: 
How Do Constitutional Courts Serve 
Intergenerational Justice?
The 2014 decision of the Czech Constitutional Court on striking down 
the constitutional amendment on the new election of the House of Rep-
resentatives was heavily criticised, because the content of unamendability 
that it referred to was undefined and open to interpretation, thus allowing 
judicial interpretation to define constitutional violations on a case-by-case 
basis (Roznai, 2014; Preuss, 2016). Is this wide margin for interpretation 
necessarily problematic in the decision or, rather, does this case show how 
constitutional courts are able to meet the challenges of the day by inter-
preting an constitutional text adopted in an earlier period? I believe this 
case shows that it is a legitimate and reasoned decision of the courts to 
understand how rigid constitutions are and when it is justified to change 
the understanding of a provision. 
Dealing with the adjudication of constitutional amendments, the Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court developed the coherent interpretation doctrine, 
similar to the Indian basic structure doctrine, or the constitutional identi-
ty arguments mentioned above. Constitutions cannot say precisely in ad-
vance and in abstracto what will turn out to be unconstitutional in a future 
case. This phenomenon is definitely in favour of the flexibility of a con-
stitutional text. The constitution applies for the moment. Even the most 
detailed constitutions are incapable of determining the exact outcome 
of a future case. The liberal democratic constitution declares the nature 
of constitutionalism, the fight against arbitrariness, against state capture, 
and against undue influence by courts; however, it empowers judicial in-
terpretation to set limits in specific future cases through the application of 
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the constitutional text. The concept of the normative constitution believes 
in institutions, structures, and concepts such as communication, balance, 
cooperation, negotiated values, and structured procedures. Legal interpre-
tation by the constitutional courts or by other judicial bodies enforcing the 
constitution is regarded, therefore, as yet another procedure to secure jus-
tice in a constitutional democracy (Rawls, 1996, p. 239). As such, it is in 
line with the original purpose of modern legal interpretation (Tóth, 2015). 
Within the concept of legal constitutionalism, when the constitution is 
part of the normative order, constitutional adjudication is perceived as a 
special pillar of constitutional construction. Without judicial review the 
constitution can be amended unlawfully without consequences; therefore, 
the entire normative construction collapses. Without interpretation it is 
not possible to define what the law is, while interpretation makes it pos-
sible for all generations to have their constitutional justice based on the 
same constitution. This normative approach makes it possible for future 
generations to validate their own interpretation of the constitution by 
constitutional adjudication, because constitutional judges must give jus-
tified reasons for the very generation of the case by the rule of law. Even 
if we have theoretical and actual disputes over who should be the final in-
terpreter of the constitution, for the sake of our normative argumentation, 
it is reasonable to say that, for intergenerational justice, constitutional 
courts or supreme courts are rightly empowered to discover and define 
the meaning of constitutional provisions.
The entire constitutional construction, however, retains at least one pillar, 
one unamendable rule of the equal human dignity of the person. Consti-
tutional courts make sure that this pillar remains stable and invalidates all 
acts of amendment that try to eliminate it. They remain the guardians of 
the constitution, as the constitution and the constitutional court attached 
to it will not eliminate themselves. The claim on intergenerational justice 
is also embedded in this concept of the modern democratic constitution.
Once it is established, constitutional review as such is undeletable as 
well, according to this idea of legal constitutionalism. Once a constitu-
tion implements constitutional review, in case of conflict, the instrument 
of constitutional review is of ultimate necessity to say if a piece of law is 
contradictory to the constitution or not. There is no validity without a 
potential review. It is necessary to accept, based on pure logic, that consti-
tutional review as such cannot, accordingly, be validly eliminated from the 
constitutional order. And this is what might serve – following the above 
argumentation – intergenerational justice.
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4.  Intergenerational Fairness of the Stability of a 
Normative Constitution
Many argue that the Ewigkeitsklausel or implicit unamendability as judi-
cial discovery is not eternal, because law as a social construct cannot be 
eternal per definitionem, and the constituent power therefore cannot bur-
den future generations (Bentham 1843, p. 403). What is more, as Acker-
man (1998) points out, constitutions sometimes change independently of 
changes to their text, and these changes are sometimes more significant 
than the formal amendments. What is then the relevance of my discussion 
on the normative constitution?
Constructing formal or informal unamendability as the essential feature 
of normative constitutionalism means that, within one constitutional sys-
tem, it is not possible to amend the constitution either by constitution-
al amendment or by interpretation, by denying the nature of that very 
constitutional democracy (Albert, 2015, pp. 146–150). The validity of a 
formal amendment or the validity of a constitutional interpretation is a 
normative issue in a rule-of-law democracy. I have argued that normativi-
ty in this sense means that previously agreed and settled legal rules apply 
both to constitutional amendments and to their judicial interpretation. 
It does not give a formal definition of the content, but rather a formal 
definition of certain rules regarding basic values such as equal human 
dignity, institutions such as the constitutional court, and procedures such 
as constitutional review.
Unamendable norms are unamendable only in a legal sense; their norma-
tive status belongs to a given constitutional order created by society to 
ensure stability, democracy and freedom, limited government, and fun-
damental rights protection for the present and the future. I argue about 
intergenerational justice in this framework. A given constitutional order 
comes to its end if its unamendable norms disperse. As a result, a new 
order is created. The normative approach does not exclude the possibility 
of creating a new order (Körössényi, 2015), even if it does not reflect on 
this, because that is beyond its aims. The complexity of self-determination 
of future generations remains possible, because in the case of a complete 
rejection of the former system people of all generations have the right to 
step out of the normative system.
In Hungarian legal literature, it is András Bragyova who formulated the 
most convincing arguments that justify the unamendability of certain pro-
visions of the former Hungarian Constitution and the Hungarian Fun-
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damental Law, and explain the relevance of this question from the point 
of view of European integration. He expressed this view not only in legal 
scholarship, but in his concurring and dissenting opinions in constitution-
al court case law as a former judge. 
He explains that all members of the European Union should know the lim-
its of the amendability of their own constitutions, because intense disputes 
have arisen across Europe with regard to the limits of the transfer of state 
sovereignty to the European Union. The absolute limits of such transfers lie 
in unamendable norms or in the otherwise defined unamendability of the 
constitutions of the member states. Pure political consensus, for example, 
cannot consent to certain EU developments if they are in contradiction 
with the unamendable parts of a constitution (Bragyova, 2003, p. 76).
Normative constitutional orders undoubtedly scale back the number of 
possibilities for change by providing a clear legal framework. All genera-
tions have the chance, however, to challenge the “indoctrination” of this 
framework, because law as a social construct is limited in nature and open 
to change. The normative construction of judicial constitutional interpre-
tation is a balanced instrument to finding the balance between preserva-
tion and adaptation. I believe, therefore, that it is fair to give constitutions 
to future generations according to this normative legal approach.
5.  Conclusion
I have argued that constitutions serve intergenerational justice on the ba-
sis of two observations. One is that it becomes difficult to interpret cor-
rectly the limiting, binding nature of the constitution and of the eternal 
or entrenched rules, if we forget about the legal-normative concept that 
made these ideas of strong constitutionalism and unamendability pop-
ular. The popularity of adopting a constitution and unamendable rules 
saw renewed enthusiasm worldwide after the Second World War. These 
constitutions were adopted or imposed in order to serve mostly as Grund-
norms, in a Kelsenian sense. Bearing in mind discussions in the fields of 
law, legal theory, and political philosophy, I have argued that the well-
known normative approach helps to offer satisfactory answers to concerns 
related to the promotion of intergenerational justice. It contains a degree 
of unamendability in all cases, which ensures stability, but on the other 
hand, due to the limited concept, it allows for complete change by step-
ping aside and adopting a new constitution.
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My second argument was that the normative approach serves the best 
interest of future generations, because it requires the implementation of 
constitutional adjudication. That makes the stable system flexible enough 
to serve the needs of all generations. Constitutional courts are charged 
with finding a justifiable and reasoned interpretation of the day, and they 
have the legitimacy and the capacity to meet this challenge. The judge 
adjudicating the case is a member of the generation that belongs to the 
case, and her task is to justify her choice for her generation and by the 
chosen interpretative methods within the framework of the already settled 
legal knowledge. 
The constitution as a normative concept does not recognise different gen-
erations, but rather presupposes and safeguards the continuity of law. By 
allowing the flexible adaptation of the interpreted rules, while providing 
stability, it still leaves equal room for change for all generations. 
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THE STABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN 
PROMOTING INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
Summary
This article argues that the legal normative concept of the constitution, with its 
inherent stability, does not hinder, but instead serves intergenerational justice. 
The author has two main observations. One is that unamendability belongs to 
the nature of the constitution no matter if this is specified in the constitution 
as an eternity clause or not. Even constitutions that do not contain eternity or 
other entrenchment clauses are not completely flexible, as this is the nature of the 
constitution. The strength of the stability in the normative sense depends partly 
on the jurisprudence of the constitutional court. The author argues that this a 
key element to prove that constitutions are able to serve intergenerational jus-
tice. The second argument that follows from the first one is that if constitutional 
courts play this role in interpreting the constitution, future judges can always 
adapt the constitution to the understanding of the law according to future gen-
erations. However, this argument is valid only if we accept that constitutionality 
is a normative concept and the level of abstraction of the constitution helps to 
preserve the competences of future generations. The popularity of adopting a 
constitution and unamendable rules saw renewed enthusiasm globally after the 
Second World War. Ensuring stability on the other hand yields solid ground to 
build on for new interpretations, but due to the limited concept embedded in the 
normative world, it allows for complete change as well, by stepping aside and 
adopting a new constitution. Therefore, the normative approach serves the best 
interest of future generations by requiring the implementation of constitutional 
adjudication. The constitution as a normative concept does not recognise differ-
ent generations, even if it is intragenerational and intergenerational, but rather 
presupposes and safeguards the continuity of the law. By allowing the flexible 
adaptation of the interpreted rules, while providing stability, it leaves equal room 
for change for all generations. 
Keywords: constitutionalism, intergenerational justice, eternity clause, consti-
tutional court
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STABILNOST USTAVA I NJEGOVA ULOGA U PROMICANJU 
MEĐUGENERACIJSKE PRAVEDNOSTI 
Sažetak
U radu se zastupa tvrdnja da prirodna stabilnost normativnog ustava omo-
gućava, tj. ne priječi, međugeneracijsku pravednost. U radu se navode dva glav-
na zapažanja. Prvo glasi da je nepromjenjivost prirodno obilježje ustava čak 
i kada on ne sadržava klauzulu vječnosti te tako ni ustav koji ne sadržava 
klauzulu vječnosti ili neku drugu klauzulu ukorijenjenosti nije u potpunosti fl-
eksibilan. Razina stabilnosti u normativnom smislu dijelom ovisi o ustavnome 
sudu. Prema autorici, to je ključni dokaz da ustav može omogućiti međugen-
eracijsku pravednost. Iz prvoga slijedi drugo zapažanje: ako je takva uloga 
ustavnog suda u tumačenju ustava, ustavni će suci uvijek moći prilagoditi ustav 
ovisno o tome kako će buduće generacije tumačiti zakone. No taj je argument 
valjan jedino ako ustavnost prihvaćamo kao normativnu. Popularnost usvajan-
ja ustava i nepromjenjivih pravila iznova je porasla na globalnoj razini nakon 
Drugoga svjetskog rata. Stabilnost pruža solidan temelj za nova tumačenja, no 
s obzirom na ograničenja koja nameće normativnost također dopušta i temeljnu 
promjenu u smislu usvajanja novoga ustava. Stoga je normativan pristup u na-
jboljem interesu budućih generacija jer zahtijeva primjenu ustavnog sudovanja. 
Normativni ustav ne čini razliku među generacijama, bez obzira na to što je 
unutargeneracijski i međugeneracijski, već štiti zakonski kontinuitet. Time što 
omogućava fleksibilnu prilagodbu protumačenih pravila istovremeno osigurava 
stabilnost i svim generacijama nudi jednaku mogućnost za promjene. 
Ključne riječi: ustavnost, međugeneracijska pravednost, klauzula vječnosti, 
ustavni sud 
